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THE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP DECISION AND THE
CLASH BETWEEN NONDISCRIMINATION
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
KLINT W. ALEXANDER, PH.D, J.D.*
I. Introduction
During the past decade, individuals identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual,
or transgender (LGBT) have made significant progress in obtaining legal
protections under federal and state law.1 The Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges to recognize same-sex marriage was a
turning point and catalyst for extending civil rights protections to LGBT
people.2 Since Obergefell, the general prohibition against “sex”
discrimination found in many federal and state statutes addressing
employment, education, housing, and public accommodations has been
interpreted rather liberally by some courts to include sexual orientation and
gender identity, thus emboldening LGBT people to seek legal redress when
they are fired, refused promotion, or denied goods and services in the
marketplace. In response to this trend, lawmakers opposed to the expansion
of LGBT rights have enacted religious exemption laws aimed at protecting
individuals who claim that certain LGBT anti-discrimination laws violate
their religious or moral beliefs. Today, two-fifths of all U.S. states have
anti-discrimination laws that specifically protect LGBT people against both
sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, while several others
have passed religious exemption laws protecting individuals, churches, nonprofit organizations, and corporations from anti-discrimination laws that
burden their religious beliefs.
Against this backdrop, U.S. courts have increasingly become the
battleground for resolving disputes over discrimination against LGBT
people in employment, education, housing, and public accommodations
where the principles of religious liberty and nondiscrimination are in
conflict. Both principles are important pillars of American democracy, and
laws enacted by the government and interpreted by the courts should
consistently affirm these basic rights. The key question for this Article,
then, is which of these principles prevails over the other in the context of
* Dr. Klint W. Alexander is Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming
College of Law.
1. This article uses the acronym “LGBT” to describe the universe of individuals who
identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer.
2. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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LGBT rights when there is a conflict between the two? The highly
anticipated Supreme Court case of Masterpiece Cakeshop vs. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission3 was supposed to answer this question. The
expectation among legal scholars was that this case would provide
important guidance concerning the uneven recognition of LGBT rights
under federal and state antidiscrimination laws and the role of religious
liberty and free expression in this calculus.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the legal implications of the
recent Masterpiece Cakeshop decision for LGBT rights and future judicial
decision-making surrounding the issue of whether the principles of
religious freedom and nondiscrimination can co-exist in the post-Obergefell
era. In particular, this Article will examine whether the Masterpiece
Cakeshop decision supports or undercuts the recent trend by courts to
expand LGBT rights to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity in the face of religious exemption laws. Part I will
discuss the history and meaning behind the First Amendment’s “free
exercise” of religion clause and the major laws prohibiting sex
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and education. This
Part will also address some of the key federal and state cases where courts
have interpreted anti-discrimination laws more broadly to include claims
based on sexual orientation and gender identity, notwithstanding religious
freedom justifications for discriminatory treatment. Part II will analyze the
recent Masterpiece Cakeshop decision and its legal implications for LGBT
rights and First Amendment jurisprudence. This Part will show that though
the Supreme Court, in the end, failed to resolve the conflict between the
principles of religious freedom and nondiscrimination in this particular
case, it did provide useful guidance for courts to consider in cases involving
the denial of goods and services to LGBT people in public
accommodations. The Article will conclude by arguing that the Supreme
Court may have temporarily dodged a bullet by punting on the question of
where to draw the line in disputes involving LGBT discrimination and
religious freedom claims when the two are in conflict. Nonetheless, the
Masterpiece Cakeshop decision will be remembered as an important
stepping stone in the struggle for LGBT rights and the effort to promote
greater tolerance in society.

3. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018).
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II. The Heart of the Debate: Freedom of Religion v. Freedom
from Discrimination
A. The Meaning of “Free Exercise” of Religion
The First Amendment’s religion clauses provide that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.”4 The first clause, known as the Establishment Clause,
was derived from the Enlightenment idea held by several of the Framers of
the American republic that religious beliefs should not intertwine with
affairs of the state. Thomas Jefferson declared in his famous speech before
the Danbury Baptist Church that the Establishment Clause creates a “wall
of separation between church and state.”5 Because some of the Framers
viewed religion as a divisive force in the aftermath of the religious wars in
Europe, they wrote the Establishment Clause with the intent to keep church
and state completely separate.6 In the words of Theodore I.T. Plucknett,
“[a]though some things were Caesar’s, others were God’s, and from this
fundamental conflict arose the problem of Church and State, which has
lasted from Constantine’s day to our own.”7
The second clause is known as the Free Exercise Clause. It protects the
right of American citizens to engage in religious expression and accept any
religious belief. Courts have interpreted the Clause to mean that while the
government can place no limits on one’s religious beliefs, it can place some
limits on the freedom to practice one’s religion. In one of the most famous
free exercise cases in American legal history, Reynolds v. United States, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not protect the
religious practice of polygamy.8 The Court stated that while marriage is a
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Thomas Jefferson, Address Before a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Church
Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 307
(Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1998).
6. KLINTON W. ALEXANDER & KERN ALEXANDER, HIGHER EDUCATION LAW: POLICY &
PERSPECTIVES 58 (2d ed. 2017).
7. THEODORE FRANK THOMAS PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
(1956).
8. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), George Reynolds, a member of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal
Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife.
Id. at 161. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional because his religion required
him to marry multiple women. Id. The law, in his view, violated his First Amendment right
to free exercise of religion. Id. at 161-62. The Court upheld Reynolds's conviction and
Congress’s power to prohibit polygamy. Id. at 167, 169.
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“sacred obligation,” it is nevertheless “usually regulated by law” in “most
civilized nations.”9 Additionally, the Court noted that people cannot avoid a
law due to their religion.10 The Court reasoned that the law permits limited
restrictions on the freedom to exercise one’s faith because religious
freedom may affect others in society.
Since the Reynolds decision, courts have struggled to describe “the
practice of religion.” In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court established a
four-part “compelling interest” test to determine the limits of the Free
Exercise Clause.11 According to the test, a court must first decide (a)
whether an individual has a claim involving a sincere religious belief, and
(b) whether the government action places a substantial burden on the
person’s ability to act on that belief.12 If these two elements are established,
then the government must show (c) that it is acting in furtherance of a
“compelling state interest,” and (d) that it has pursued that interest in the
manner least restrictive, or least burdensome, to religion.13 However, in
1990, the Supreme Court modified the Sherbert Test in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith when it held
that the government no longer had to justify a burden on the free exercise of
religion by a compelling state interest if that burden was an unintended
result of laws that are generally applicable.14 In other words, Smith
narrowed the scope in which a free exercise claim can be asserted under the
compelling interest test to those instances where either the government
passed a law or took action that intended to prohibit the free exercise of

9. Id. at 165.
10. Id. at 166-67.
11. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause required the government to demonstrate both a
compelling interest and that the law in question was narrowly tailored before it denied
unemployment compensation to someone who was fired because her job requirements
substantially conflicted with her religion. Id. at 403. The case established the Sherbert Test,
which sets forth the conditions for what is known as strict scrutiny.
12. Id; see also Scott Bomboy, Arizona’s Religious Freedom Debate and the Sherbert
Test; CONSTITUTION CENTER (Feb. 26, 2014), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/arizonasreligious-freedom-or-discrimination-debate-defined/ (summarizing the Sherbert test as, “if a
person claimed a sincere religious belief, and a government action placed a substantial
burden on that belief, the government needed to prove a compelling state interest, and that it
pursued that action in the least burdensome way”).
13. Id.
14. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith,
the Court permitted the state of Oregon to deny unemployment benefits to Native American
plaintiffs who were fired for ingesting peyote during a religious ceremony. Id. at 883, 890.
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religion or violated other constitutional rights.15 This modification of the
test prompted national legislation to restore Sherbert’s broader free exercise
exemption rule.
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) to “ensure that interests in religious freedom are protected.”16
Under RFRA, Congress broadened the application of the Sherbert Test
statutorily to all laws and regulations, both federal and state.17 According to
the law, “Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and is
the “least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”18 In practice, RFRA meant that a plaintiff could file a religious
discrimination lawsuit to obtain relief from another federal or state law that
might infringe upon one’s religious views. For example, a business owner
could challenge an insurance law requiring employers to provide abortion
counseling as part of a company’s health insurance package. Alternatively,
certain defendants—such as religious charities—could invoke RFRA as a
defense to a lawsuit for gender discrimination.
Four years after the enactment of RFRA, the Supreme Court held in City
of Boerne v. Flores that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states,
reasoning that the law was not a proper exercise of Congress's enforcement
power.19 However, it is still applicable to the federal government. Since
Flores, the Supreme Court has relied on the Sherbert Test to decide several
prominent cases, including Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente
União do Vegetal20 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.21 More recently, though,
15. Id. at 882.
16. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4 (2018))).
17. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, § 3(a)-(b), 107 Stat. at 1488-89.
18. Id. § 3(b), 107 Stat. at 1489.
19. 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
20. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). In Gonzales, the Supreme Court held that the RFRA requires
the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession and use of an otherwise
illegal drug by a religious organization, even though Congress has found that the drug has a
high potential for abuse, is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and violates an
international treaty when imported or distributed, because the government had failed to
prove a compelling interest in regulating the organization's use of drugs for religious
purposes. Id. at 428-29.
21. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). In the Hobby Lobby case, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4
decision that RFRA allows a for-profit company to deny its employees health care coverage
for contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious
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the focus of religious liberty claims has shifted to LGBT rights in the wake
of Obergefell, which legalized same-sex marriage.22 Socially conservative
lawmakers have worked to restore the original Sherbert Test through
legislation at the state level,23 arguing in favor of the right to fire, deny
promotion, and refuse goods and services to LGBT people based upon
religious justifications.
State legislatures have passed a number of “religious exemption” laws
that undermine protections gained by LGBT people since Obergefell. Some
of these laws permit business owners such as bakers, caterers, florists, and
photographers to refuse goods and services to same-sex couples. For
example, Mississippi’s House Bill 1523 is the most comprehensive state
law, explicitly permitting discriminatory conduct against LGBT persons in
numerous areas, including the provision of wedding services.24 Other laws
permit health care providers and adoption agencies to refuse services to
LGBT people.25 In Tennessee, for example, a law was enacted recently to
permit mental health counselors to turn away clients based on their
religious beliefs.26 In Michigan, too, adoption and foster care agencies are
authorized to refuse to place children with LGBT parents based on religious
objections.27 A third type of law prevents the government from denying

objections of the company's owners. Id. at 734-36. Known as the contraceptive mandate, the
regulation required companies with fifty or more employees to provide insurance coverage
of the twenty contraceptive methods then approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
Id. at 693, 696.
22. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Obergefell was a landmark civil
rights case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the fundamental right
to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at
2604-05. The ruling meant that all fifty states must lawfully perform and recognize the
marriages of same-sex couples on the same terms and conditions as the marriages of
opposite-sex couples, with all the accompanying rights and responsibilities. Id. at 2607-08.
23. In some states, these efforts have been successful. However, in others, the courts
have ruled that the compelling-interest test is applicable to religious claims by virtue of the
state’s own constitution. Still, in some states, the level of protection for free-exercise claims
remains uncertain. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
24. H.B. 1523, § 2, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016).
25. See, e.g., S.B. 1556, § 1(a), 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016).
26. Id.
27. H.B. 4188, § 2, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015). Alabama, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Texas, and Virginia also have adoption and foster care exemptions in place. See
S.B. 149, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2016); H.B. 3859, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017);
H.B. 189, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012); Associated Press, New Alabama Law Lets
Adoption Groups Turn Away Same-Sex Couples, NBC NEWS (May 4, 2017, 6:55 AM CDT),
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licenses, funding, or contracts to service providers who discriminate based
on religious beliefs. Michigan’s House Bill 4188 and South Dakota’s
Senate Bill 149, for instance, prohibit the government from taking adverse
action against a child placement agency because of its refusal to provide
services based on religious beliefs.28
The challenge for lawmakers who support religious exemption laws is
finding the right balance between the goals of protecting religious freedom
and prohibiting discrimination. Some of these laws, like Mississippi’s
House Bill 1523, are simply licenses to discriminate and strongly favor
those companies or individuals who do not wish to provide services to
LGBT people.29 Other laws are more narrowly defined to allow states the
flexibility to enforce generally applicable laws of nondiscrimination when it
has a compelling reason to do so. Regardless of form, the practical effect of
such religious exemption laws is to encourage discriminatory practices
against LGBT people in the marketplace, which in turn discourages LGBT
people from seeking out goods and services in the first place. According to
Human Rights Watch, “The recent drive for religious exemptions is not
born of a neutral concern with religious liberty, but is largely the product of
resistance to recent gains in LGBT equality across the United States.”30
Thus, the key issue at the heart of the debate surrounding the Free
Exercise Clause and LGBT rights is where to draw the line between the two
ideas. Social conservatives argue that the line should be drawn in favor of
religious freedom because free exercise of religion means the right to
oppose same-sex marriage, same-sex parenting, or transgender identity in
any form. Most religious exemption laws do not include language to protect
LGBT people from discrimination because such protections are deemed to
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/new-alabama-law-lets-adoption-groups-turnaway-same-sex-n754691.
28. S.B. 149, § 2, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2017); H.B. 4188, § 2, 2015 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 2015).
29. As of 2018, “License to Discriminate” laws have been enacted in eight states:
Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, and
Virginia. Exemption bills have been filed in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Oklahoma, and
Washington. Nondiscrimination bills are pending in Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. See United States: State Laws Threaten LGBT Equality,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 2018, 12:01 AM EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2018/02/19/united-states-state-laws-threaten-lgbt-equality.
30. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “ALL WE WANT IS EQUALITY”: RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2018),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/lgbt0218_web_1.pdf.
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be irreconcilable with these religious beliefs. For example, under Catholic
doctrine, marriage is defined as the union of a man and a woman, and many
Catholic charitable organizations have adhered to this rule in denying the
adoption of children by same-sex couples.31 Thus, as same-sex marriage has
gained acceptance and legal approval over time, many Catholic agencies
closed down their adoption and foster care services on the grounds that their
freedom of religion had been violated.32
In the aftermath of Obergefell, much of the focus of religious freedom
claims has shifted to the transgender community. At present, courts in
California and Texas are addressing lawsuits over the refusal of hospitals to
perform medical procedures on transgender individuals based upon
religious beliefs.33 According to a recent study performed by the Center for
American Progress, thousands of transgender adults experience health care
discrimination each year, and the majority of discrimination complaints
filed by transgender people with the Department of Health and Human
Services’ Office of Civil Rights are related to medical care that has nothing
31. Claire Chretien, Philadelphia Cuts Ties with Catholic Charities over Gay Foster
Parenting Refusal, LIFESITE NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018, 11:28 AM EST),
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/philadelphia-cuts-ties-with-catholic-charities-over-gayfoster-parenting-re (“‘A man and a woman united in marriage, together with their children,
form a family,’ the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches (CCC 2202). ‘This institution
is prior to any recognition by public authority, which has an obligation to recognize it. It
should be considered the normal reference point by which the different forms of family
relationship are to be evaluated.’”).
32. Catholic Charities withdrew from adoption and foster care services in
Massachusetts, Illinois, California, and Washington, D.C., rather than comply with
nondiscrimination laws that protect same-sex couples. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Bishops
Say Rules on Gay Parents Limit Freedom of Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011), https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/us/for-bishops-a-battle-over-whose-rights-prevail.html;
Joseph LaPlant, Tough Times for Catholic Adoption Agencies, OUR SUNDAY VISITOR (May
7,
2014),
https://www.osv.com/OSVNewsweekly/Article/TabId/535/ArtMID/13567/
ArticleID/14666/Tough-times-for-Catholic-adoption-agencies.aspx;
Amanda
Paulson,
Several States Weigh Ban on Gay Adoptions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 15, 2006),
https://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0315/p02s02-ussc.html.
33. In California v. Azar, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling enjoining
enforcement of Trump Administration’s new rules that would allow employers and
universities to use religion to deny their employees and students health insurance coverage
for birth control. 911 F.3d 558, 581-82 (9th Cir. 2018). In Texas, a federal district judge
temporarily stopped enforcement of the protections for transgender patients, saying that
Congress had outlawed discrimination based on sex—“the biological differences between
males and females”—but not transgender status. See Robert Pear, Trump Plan Would Cut
Back Health Care Protections for Transgender People, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/us/politics/trump-transgender-health-care.html.
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to do with gender transition.34 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) sought to
address this issue by prohibiting health care providers and insurance
companies from engaging in discrimination.35 Under an Obama
Administration rule, transgender people were explicitly protected against
discrimination in health care on the basis of their gender identity and sex
stereotypes. However, the Trump Administration has been working to make
it easier for health care providers to discriminate against LGBT people on
religious grounds. The new head of the Department of Health and Human
Services’ Office of Civil Rights, Roger Severino, recently stated that the
federal government will be more open to listening to complaints of
conscience.36 He has created a special agency, the Division of Conscience
and Religious Freedom, which aims to ensure that health care providers’
religious liberties are not violated.37 The creation of the new division is
pursuant to an executive order signed by President Trump called
"Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty."38 The order has spawned
new rules aimed at removing the legal mandate that health insurance
provide contraception. To date, more conscience-based complaints have
been filed with the Office of Civil Rights under President Trump than in all
eight years of Obama’s presidency.39

34. See Shabab Ahmed Mirza & Caitlin Rooney, Discrimination Prevents LGBTQ
People from Accessing Health Care, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2018/01/18/445130/discriminationprevents-lgbtq-people-accessing-health-care/.
35. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
260, sec. 1557(a) (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. S 18116 (2018)). The ACA prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability in “any health
program or activity” that receives federal financial assistance. Id.
36. Alison Kodjak, Civil Rights Chief at HHS Defends the Right to Refuse Care on
Religious Grounds, NPR (Mar. 20, 2018, 3:38 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/03/20/591833000/civil-rights-chief-at-hhs-defends-the-right-to-refuse-care-onreligious-grounds.
37. See Cynthia Romero, Religious Freedom Is Not a License to Discriminate, AM.
CONST. SOC’Y (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/religious-freedom-is-not-alicense-to-discriminate/; see also Kodjak, supra note 36. This agency will effectively give
doctors, nurses, and other medical staff cover to discriminate against LGBT people, because
providers will now get protection from the federal government if they cite religious or moral
objections to refuse service to LGBT patients.
38. Toni Clarke, U.S. Government to Shield Health Workers Under “Religious
Freedom,” U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 18, 2018, 10:47 AM), https://www.usnews.com/
news/us/articles/2018-01-18/us-government-creates-health-division-for-religious-freedom.
39. See supra note 37 and accompanying sources.
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President Trump has taken steps to dismantle Obama-era protections for
transgender persons in other areas as well, such as the military and
employment. On March 23, 2018, the Trump Administration reissued its
ban on transgender people in the military.40 The Obama Administration
fought for years to reverse “don’t ask, don’t tell”—which banned openly
gay people from serving in the military—and was making progress on
reversing a similar ban on open transgender service members. In addition,
the Trump Administration reversed the Obama-era policy that used Title
VII to protect transgender employees from discrimination.41 President
Trump issued “‘religious liberty’ guidance to federal agencies, essentially
asking [federal employees] to respect religious-liberty protections’ in all of
the government’s work.”42 It is still unclear what effect this guidance will
have on LGBT protections, but LGBT organizations are concerned that it
will be used to justify discrimination against LGBT employees working for
the federal government.43
40. The exceptions are persons who have been “stable for 36 consecutive months in
their biological sex prior to accession [and] service members who do not require a change of
gender.” Statement by Transgender Client of the Military Religious Freedom Foundation
(MRFF) on the Reissued Ban on Transgender People in the Military, MIL. RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM FOUND. (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/2018/03/
statement-by-transgender-client-of-the-military-religious-freedom-foundation-mrff-on-thereissued-ban-on-transgenders-in-the-military/; see also Amanda Kerri, The Christian
Takeover of the U.S. Military, ADVOC., (Mar. 29, 2018, 12:54 PM EDT),
https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2018/3/29/christian-takeover-us-military.
41. Sessions’ DOJ Reverses Transgender Workplace Protections, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5,
2017, 12:35 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sessions-doj-reverses-obama-eratransgender-work-protections. Under Obama, the Department of Justice adopted the position
that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity was a
violation of Title VII. Id.
42. German Lopez, Trump Promised to Be LGBTQ-friendly. His First Year in Office
Proved It Was a Giant Con., VOX, (Jan. 22, 2018, 8:00 AM EST) https://www.vox.com/
identities/2018/1/22/16905658/trump-lgbtq-anniversary. In 2014, President Obama signed
Executive Order 13672, adding “gender identity” to the categories protected against
discrimination in hiring federal employees and both “sexual orientation” and “gender
identity” to the categories protected against discrimination in hiring federal contractors.
Executive Order – Further Amendments to Executive Order 11478, Equal Employment
Opportunity in the Federal Government, and Executive Order 11246, Equal Employment
Opportunity, WHITE HOUSE (July 21, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2014/07/21/executive-order-further-amendments-executive-order-11478-equalemploymen.
43. Trump has maintained existing executive orders that prohibit the federal
government and federal contractors from discriminating against employees based on sexual
orientation and gender identity. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (June
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In response to the Trump Administration’s support for “religious liberty”
guidance, several Republican Senators on March 8, 2018, reintroduced the
First Amendment Defense Act (FADA) “designed to prevent the federal
government from discriminating against individuals or institutions based on
their beliefs about marriage.”44 Specifically, the bill prohibits the federal
government from taking action against an individual based on actions or
beliefs in accordance with a “religious [] or moral conviction that [(1)]
marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one
woman,” or (2) sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage.45
In contrast to previously proposed legislation, FADA frames the bill as
responding to “conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty”
and protects those whose religious beliefs put them in opposition to samesex marriage recognized under federal law.46 In practical terms, FADA
would permit individuals and businesses using public money from grants or
contracts with the federal government to discriminate against same-sex
couples in housing, employment, and education, as long as their actions are
based on their belief about marriage. During a 2016 press conference, thenpresidential nominee Donald Trump said, “If I am elected president and
Congress passes the First Amendment Defense Act, I will sign it to protect
the deeply held religious beliefs of Catholics and the beliefs of Americans
of all faiths.”47
The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of religion is a
fundamental human rights concern, and the government is obliged to refrain
from imposing restrictions on this right. However, when religious freedom
and conscience-based exemption laws clash with other laws, such as the
prohibition against sex discrimination, courts are faced with the challenge
of determining which of these laws prevails. The next section examines the
significant federal and state anti-discrimination laws in place to protect
2, 1998). But see Zack Ford, Trump Revokes Executive Order, Weakens Protections for
LGBT
Workers,
THINKPROGRESS
(Mar.
29,
2017,
12:53
PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/trump-gutted-lgbt-executive-order-8dd0e3be69a/
(discussing
Executive Order 13,672).
44. Julie Moreau, GOP Reintroduces Bill Pitting ‘Religious Freedom’ Against Gay
Marriage, NBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2018, 12:54 PM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/gop-reintroduces-bill-pitting-religious-freedom-against-gay-marriagen855836; see also First Amendment Defense Act, S.B. 2525, 115th Cong. (2018).
45. First Amendment Defense Act, S.B. 2525, § 3(a), 115th Cong. (2018).
46. Id. § 2(a).
47. Morgan Brinlee, Donald Trump Just Quietly Admitted He’s Going to Sign This AntiLGBTQ Bill, BUSTLE (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/p/donald-trump-just-quietlyadmitted-hes-going-to-sign-this-anti-lgbtq-bill-26960.
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LGBT rights, and some of the key court cases interpreting these laws,
which set the stage for the Supreme Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop
decision.
B. Anti-Discrimination Laws and LGBT Rights
For decades, LGBT people have experienced discrimination in the
United States without adequate legal protections in place. As a result of the
2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Obergefell, same-sex couples can
marry nationwide and states must extend all the rights and benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples. These rights and benefits include medical
decision-making and joint adoption authority for married same-sex couples.
However, the laws covering LGBT persons in other areas are still in a state
of flux. This section examines the main federal and state laws established to
prohibit discrimination in employment, education, and public
accommodations contexts, and how courts are interpreting these laws with
respect to LGBT rights.
1. Federal Law Protection of LGBT Rights
a) Title VII – Employment
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employer discrimination
on the basis of “race, color, national origin, sex, or religion.”48 Title VII
applies to both public and private entities.49 The power of Congress to
regulate and prohibit discrimination by a state actor is justified under
Section 5 of the Equal Protection Clause. That provision enforces
constitutional prohibitions against discrimination for specified
classifications of persons. Section 703(a) prohibits private discrimination
and is justified under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution
(Commerce Clause). According to Title VII, section 703(a)(1):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . .50

48. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018) (as
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972).
49. Id. § 2000e(b).
50. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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Congress did not define the word “sex” in Title VII. Barbara Lindemann
and David Kadue, citing to judicial definitions of “sex,” explain that “it
describes not only a basis protected by statute, but also an activity.”51 The
word “gender”, too, is defined as “the behavioral, cultural or psychological
traits typically associated with one sex.”52 In 1976, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
wrote that the term “sex,” in referencing “sex discrimination,” could be
viewed as an invocation of sexuality, whereas the term “[g]ender, by
contrast, has a neutral, clinical tone that may ward off distracting
associations.”53 Ginsburg’s influence precipitated a shift in the Supreme
Court’s use of the term “gender” in place of “sex” after 1976.
Title VII does not specifically mention sexual orientation or gender
identity. Sexual orientation refers to an individual’s sexual or emotional
attraction to men, women, or members of both sexes, while gender identity
refers to how a person self-identifies (male, female, or alternative gender)
that may or may not conform to that person’s primary or secondary sexual
characteristics or assigned sex at birth.54 In 2015, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that Title VII should be interpreted
to cover sexual orientation in Baldwin v. Foxx.55 The Obama
Administration, seeking to expand LGBT rights, included gender identity
among the classes protected against discrimination under the authority of
the EEOC.56 However, the Department of Justice, under the Trump
Administration, has taken the position that the law does not recognize
gender identity or transgender status as a basis to protect LGBT rights. 57
The current split among federal agencies in interpreting the meaning of
“sex discrimination” makes it difficult for courts to enforce Title VII.
51. BARBARA LINDEMAN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 51 (1999).
52. Id.
53. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1976).
54. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminology-anddefinitions (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
55. EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15, 2015).
56. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General Holder
Directs Department to Include Gender Identity Under Sex Discrimination Employment
Claims (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directsdepartment-include-gender-identity-under-sex-discrimination.
57. Memorandum from the Attorney General on Revised Treatment of Transgender
Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Oct. 4,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download. Under President Obama, the
Department of Justice adopted the position that employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity was a violation of Title VII. Id. at 2.
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During the 1980s, the Supreme Court extended the scope of Title VII in
Price Waterhouse, Inc. v. Hopkins to prohibit discrimination based on nonconformance with gender norms, stereotypes, and other sex-based
considerations.58 Nearly a decade later, the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc. held that Title VII reaches same-sex
discrimination.59 While Congress may not have had this in mind in 1964, on
its face the words “discriminate because of sex” in the Act do not embrace
only the opposite sex.60 The precedents established in Price Waterhouse
and Oncale provided LGBT people who were harassed at work with an
opening to seek legal recourse under Title VII. Since the Oncale decision,
courts have applied these precedents to expand protections to those who
defy certain stereotypes or expectations as to how a person of a particular
sex or gender should look or act.
Recently, several federal appellate courts have found that discrimination
based on sexual orientation is cognizable under Title VII. In Hively v. Ivy
Tech Community of College of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit stated that
“[a]ny discomfort, disapproval or job decision based on the fact that the
complainant—woman or man—dresses differently, speaks differently, or
dates or marries a same-sex partner is a reaction purely and simply based on
sex.”61 Thus, there is no distinction between a gender nonconformity claim
58. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In this case, a female associate of an accounting firm sued her
employer for sex discrimination after the firm denied her a promotion to partner. Id. at 23132. A motivating factor in the employer’s decision to deny her partnership was stereotyped
thinking about her need for a “course at charm school,” her “overcompensat[ion] for being a
woman,” and the importance that she “walk more femininely.” Id. at 235. The Supreme
Court held that discrimination based on non-conformance with gender norms, stereotypes,
and other sex-based considerations was a violation of Title VII. Id. at 251; see also Mark C.
Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive
Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495, 502 (1990).
59. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). In Oncale, a male employee brought a Title VII action against
his former employer and against his male supervisors and co-workers, alleging sexual
harassment. Id. at 77. The Supreme Court held that sex discrimination consisting of samesex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. Id. at 82.
60. Id. at 79.
61. 853 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 2017). In Hively, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex includes sexual
orientation. Id. at 352. The en banc majority wrote, “[T]he common-sense reality that it is
actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without discriminating
on the basis of sex, persuade[s] us that the time has come to overrule our previous cases that
have endeavored to find and observe that line.” Id. at 351. Moreover, the court indicated that
it would be open to including gender identity and transgender status under Title VII. See id.
at 363-64. “Our panel,” the court wrote, “described the line between a gender nonconformity
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and a sexual orientation claim. The court also noted that bias based on
sexual orientation constitutes associational discrimination because “[i]f we
were to change the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome
would be different.”62 The First Circuit, too, upheld a $700,000 jury award
for a lesbian firefighter who experienced harassment from her co-workers at
the Providence Fire Department, stating that there was more than enough
evidence to support her “sex plus” discrimination claim under Title VII,
where the “plus” in her case was her sexual orientation.63 Furthermore, the
Second Circuit in 2018 held that Title VII prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination, but it did not go so far as to say that Title VII prohibited
discrimination based on gender identity.64
These decisions are at odds with a 2017 Eleventh Circuit decision, Evans
v. Georgia Regional Hospital, wherein the court concluded that it was
bound by past precedent to hold that sexual orientation was not a protected
characteristic under Title VII.65 In this case, Jameka Evans claimed that she
was subjected to discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation
while working at Georgia Regional Hospital.66 The Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the sexual orientation discrimination was not actionable, but the claim
claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin; we conclude that it does not
exist at all.” Id. at 346.
62. Id. at 349; see also Evan Gibbs & Rebecca Silk, Second Circuit Says Sexual
Orientation Is Protected Under Title VII, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 27, 2018, 9:59 AM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/02/second-circuit-says-sexual-orientation-is-protected-undertitle-vii/?rf=1.
63. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 52 (2018). A female firefighter
presented evidence that she was repeatedly called “Frangina”; “that women were treated as
less competent”;” “that men treated women better when they were perceived as willing to
have sex with them”; and that the firefighter “was subjected to humiliating sexual remarks
and innuendos by [subordinates], including asking her if she wanted to have babies and if he
could help her conceive.” Id. at 40, 55.
64. Zarda v. Altitude Express Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018). The plaintiff in the
case, a skydiver, claimed that his employer fired him because of his sexual orientation. Id. at
108-09. The plaintiff subsequently died in a base-jumping accident shortly after filing suit,
but his estate took up the case and is continuing to prosecute it. Id. at 107 n.1. A three-judge
panel of the Second Circuit initially held that the instructor had no claim under Title VII
because sexual orientation was not a protected class. Id. at 110. The plaintiff, however,
requested an en banc review and the Second Circuit sitting en banc reversed the panel’s
decision. Id. at 108.
65. 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017); see also
Greg Stohr, U.S. Supreme Court Turns Away Sexual-Orientation Bias Case, BLOOMBERG:
POLITICS (Dec. 11, 2017, 8:31 AM CST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201712-11/sexual-orientation-bias-case-turned-away-by-u-s-supreme-court.
66. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1251.
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could proceed because the facts supported a permissible Title VII claim of
sex discrimination based on gender nonconformity. Given the split in the
federal circuits on whether sexual orientation should be included under
Title VII, it is likely that the Supreme Court will address this issue in the
near future.
Some federal appellate courts have been in favor of extending civil rights
protections for LGBT employees to include gender identity or transgender
status.67 In a landmark Title VII discrimination case that is expected to go
to the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit recently ruled that the firing of a
transgender employee by a Michigan funeral home for disclosing that she
was transitioning from male to female constituted sex discrimination under
Title VII.68 The Court rejected the funeral home’s argument that it was
entitled to a religious exemption under RFRA and instead held that
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status” is, in
fact, sex discrimination.69 The court compared the situation to Title VII’s
prohibition on religious conversion discrimination, arguing that
discrimination based on a “change in . . . sex” is prohibited.70 The ruling
affirms that transgender individuals are protected by federal sex
67. The federal appellate courts for the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
found some protections in the 1964 Civil Rights Act for the category of gender identity. See,
e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401
F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Schwenck v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000);
Rosa v. Parks W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
68. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. 2018). In
this case, Aimee Stephens had worked for nearly six years as a funeral director at R.G. and
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes when she informed the funeral home’s owner that she was a
transgender woman and planned to start dressing in appropriate business attire for a woman.
Id. She asked for understanding and support. Instead, the owner fired her two weeks later,
explaining that it would be unacceptable for her to present and dress as a woman. Id. at 56869. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes unlawfully discriminated against Aimee Stephens when it fired her after she told her
employer that she would begin presenting as a woman because she was transgender. Id. at
600. The decision reverses the lower court’s decision, which held that religious belief was
sufficient to exempt the employer from anti-discrimination laws. Id. at 567.
69. Id. at 574-75. Judge Karen Moore, who wrote the Sixth Circuit opinion, held that
Title VII outlaws anti-trans employment discrimination for two reasons: (1) Title VII bars
sex stereotyping punishing an employee for her failure to conform to gender norms; and (2)
anti-trans discrimination is inherently sex-based. Id. at 572, 575; see also Mark Joseph Stern,
Businesses Can’t Fire Trans Employees for Religious Reasons, Federal Appeals Court Rules
in Landmark Decision, SLATE (Mar. 7, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/03/sixth-circuit-rules-businesses-cant-fire-transgender-employees-forreligious-reasons.html.
70. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 575.
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discrimination laws, and that religious beliefs do not give employers the
right to discriminate against them. Moreover, the case is significant because
it addressed the conflict between religious freedom under RFRA and the
principle of nondiscrimination, concluding that the compelling government
interest in eradicating employment discrimination against transgender
people trumps business owners’ religious liberty claims.
b) Title IX – Education
In 1972, Congress and the Nixon Administration enacted a number of
amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965.71 Title IX, the most wellknown of these amendments, protects people from discrimination based on
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities.72 Title IX
states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .73
Unlike Title VII, Title IX is primarily a regulatory statute designed to
ensure that institutions receiving federal funds are “compliant” with
Congress’s prohibition on sex discrimination. Title IX applies only to
institutions that receive federal financial assistance, including public and
private colleges and universities, local school districts administering
primary and secondary schools, as well as charter schools, for-profit
schools, libraries, and museums.74 The U.S. Department of Education’s
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) enforces Title IX.
In 2016, the Obama Administration interpreted Title IX to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, and
transgender status. OCR specifically issued guidance explaining that
transgender students are protected from sex discrimination under Title IX
and should be allowed to use bathrooms, locker rooms, and other sex71. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2018)). The Higher Education Act of 1965 provides
federal funding to colleges and universities and financial assistance to students.
72. Id. § 901(a), 86 Stat. at 373.
73. Id.
74. Title
IX
and
Sex
Discrimination,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html (last modified Sept. 25, 2018).
Some key issue areas in which recipients have Title IX obligations are: recruitment,
admissions, and counseling; financial assistance; athletics; sex-based harassment; treatment
of pregnant and parenting students; discipline; single-sex education; and employment.
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segregated spaces that correspond with their gender identity in public
schools, colleges, and universities. However, the Trump Administration
recently rescinded this guidance, stating in a “Dear Colleague” letter that
the guidance did not undergo a formal public review before it was released
and “that there must be ‘due regard for the primary role of [s]tates and local
school districts in establishing educational policy.’”75 According to
Secretary of Education Betsy Devos, “[s]chools, communities, and families
can find—and in many cases have found—solutions that protect all
students.”76 The Trump Administration’s withdrawal of Obama-era
guidance has created confusion about the enforcement of LGBT rights in
the educational arena, which in turn is having an impact on pending
lawsuits in a number of states.
The Fourth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to address the
scope of Title IX as applied to transgender students in the case of G.G. ex.
rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board.77 Gavin Grimm, a Virginia
transgender high school student, filed this lawsuit, alleging discrimination
under Title IX after the Gloucester County School Board passed a
resolution requiring that access to changing rooms and bathrooms be
“limited to the corresponding biological genders, and students with gender
identity issues shall be provided an alternative appropriate private
facility.”78 The Fourth Circuit held that the resolution seeking to regulate
75. Sandhya Somashekhar, Emma Brown & Moriah Balingit, Trump Administration
Rolls Back Protections for Transgender Students, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-administration-rolls-backprotections-for-transgender-students/2017/02/22/550a83b4-f913-11e6-bf01d47f8cf9b643_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c9da1344635f.
76. Id.
77. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). Later
that same year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also found in favor of a
transgender student in a similar case stating that if the plaintiff were to be restricted from
using the restroom in line with her gender identity, she would face “irreparable harm.”
Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221-22 (6th Cir. 2016).
78. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 719, 723. As part of Gavin’s medical treatment for
severe gender dysphoria, Gavin and his mother notified administrators of his male gender
identity at the beginning of his sophomore year so that he could socially transition in all
aspects of his life. Id. at 715. With permission from school administrators, Gavin used the
boys’ restroom for almost two months without any incident. Id. at 715-16. But after
receiving complaints from some parents and residents of Gloucester County, the school
board adopted the new policy on December 9, 2014, by a vote of 6-1. Id. at 716. Grimm
refused to use the girls' bathroom and was offered the use of some broom closets that had
been retrofitted into unisex bathrooms. Verna L. Williams, Bathrooms, Not Broom Closets:
Title IX, Gavin Grimm, and Trans Students’ Rights, UC SOC. JUST., (Oct. 31, 2016),
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sex-segregated facilities was ambiguous, and that OCR’s interpretation of
this regulation pursuant to Obama-era guidance was “entitled to
deference . . . and is to be accorded controlling weight.”79 A year later, the
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s decision and vacated the
judgment, citing the Trump Administration’s withdrawal of Obama-era
guidance and its interpretation of Title IX to which the Fourth Circuit had
granted deference.80 The Supreme Court requested the federal district court
to revisit the case and rule on the underlying statutory question regarding
the scope of Title IX. In May 2018, the district court “sided with Grimm
and denied the [school] board’s request to dismiss the case.”81 The case is
now on appeal again to the Fourth Circuit to resolve whether the school
board resolution is discriminatory under Title IX.
The Gavin Grimm case is expected to have a significant impact on other
pending transgender discrimination cases around the nation. In North
Carolina, for example, a high-profile lawsuit challenging the state’s antiLGBT law, House Bill 142, is still pending.82 House Bill 142 recently

https://ucsocialjustice.com/2016/10/31/bathrooms-not-broom-closets-title-ix-gavin-grimmand-trans-students-rights/. He refused to use those as well, opting to use a bathroom in the
school nurse’s office. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 728.
79. Id. at 723. The ruling in favor of Grimm did not grant him the right to use the boys’
restrooms; rather, it directed a lower court that had ruled against him to re-evaluate his
request for injunctive relief to be able to use those restrooms. The Fourth Circuit cited an
Education Department letter that said "a school generally must treat transgender students
consistent with their gender identity." Id. at 717; see also Richard Fausset, Appeals Court
Favors Transgender Student in Virginia Restroom Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/us/appeals-court-favors-transgender-student-invirginia-restroom-case.html.
80. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017); see also Pete Williams,
Supreme Court Rejects Gavin Grimm’s Transgender Bathroom Rights Case, NBC NEWS
(Mar. 6, 2017, 5:11 PM CST), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-supreme-courtrejects-transgender-rights-case-n729556.
81. Judge: School Board Can Try to Appeal Gavin Grimm Lawsuit, AP NEWS (June 6,
2018), https://apnews.com/184dce420a574be6b60ea8297bb67a3d.
82. Carcano v. Cooper, No. 1:16-cv-236, 2018 BL 357474, at *3-4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30,
2018). The case, Carcano v. Cooper (formerly Carcano v. McCrory), was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against North Carolina Governor Pat
McCrory, Attorney General Roy Cooper, and the University of North Carolina, on behalf of
two transgender North Carolinians (Joaquín Carcaño, a UNC-Chapel Hill employee, and
Payton McGarry, a UNC-Greensboro student), Angela Gilmore (a lesbian and North
Carolina Central University law professor), and the ACLU of North Carolina and Equality
North Carolina. According to the plaintiffs, it is still ambiguous whether House Bill 142
discriminates against transgender people’s access to public restrooms. Id. at *6.
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replaced a more sweeping law, House Bill 283 (known as the “bathroom
bill”), which barred transgender people from using the restrooms and other
single-sex facilities matching their gender identity in government
buildings.84 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has sued the state
on behalf of Joaquin Carcaño, a twenty-seven-year-old transgender man
who works at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and is banned
from using public men's restrooms under the law. The complaint in
Carcano v. Cooper alleged that House Bill 142 discriminates against
students and school employees on the basis of sex and is an invasion of
privacy for transgender people pursuant to Title IX and the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.85
Federal courts have extended the same reasoning from Title VII cases to
include sexual orientation and gender identity claims in Title IX cases.
Following the Hively case, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Whitaker ex rel.
Whitaker v. Unified School District No. 1 that discrimination against
transgender students violates Title IX.86 The federal appellate court
concluded that the school district must allow Ashton Whitaker, a
transgender boy in Wisconsin, to use the boys’ restroom. “By definition,”
the court wrote that
a transgender individual does not conform to the sex‐based
stereotypes of the sex that he or she was assigned at birth. . . . A
policy that requires an individual to use a bathroom that does not
conform with his or her gender identity punishes that individual
for his or her gender non‐conformance, which in turn violates
Title IX.87
More recently, the Third Circuit in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area
School District, a case referred to as the inverse of the Gavin Grimm
lawsuit,88 ruled against a school’s policy to prohibit transgender students
from using the proper bathroom at school, concluding that Title IX
83. See Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act, H.B. DRH40005-TC-1B, 2016 Gen.
Assemb., 2d. Special Sess. (N.C. 2016), https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015E2/Bills/
House/PDF/H2v0.pdf.
84. Id. § 1.3. It also prevented cities and counties from enacting or enforcing LGBTinclusive antidiscrimination ordinances. Id. § 3.3.
85. Carcano, 2018 BL 357474, at *11, *15.
86. 858 F.3d 1034, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 2017).
87. Id. at 1048, 1049.
88. Mark Joseph Stern, Federal Court Emphatically Shoots Down Anti-Trans Lawsuit in
Rare Ruling from the Bench, SLATE (May 24, 2018, 4:13 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/05/third-circuit-shoots-down-adfs-anti-transgender-lawsuit.html.
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prohibits discrimination based on transgender status, including denial of
equal access to restrooms.89 This decision is groundbreaking, not only
because it recognizes gender identity under Title IX, but also because the
court rejected the argument that trans-inclusive policies infringe upon antitrans students’ right to “privacy.”90
Religious educational institutions are exempt from Title IX requirements
to protect First Amendment rights. Title IX states that an educational
institution is exempt when 1) it is “controlled by a religious organization,”91
and 2) prohibiting sex discrimination “would not be consistent with the
religious tenets of such [controlling] organization.”92 To date, no
educational institution has ever been denied a Title IX waiver to avoid
punishment for not providing certain accommodations (such as gender89. 897 F.3d 518, 521, 533 (3d Cir. 2018). In this case, Cisgender high school students
brought an action against the school district superintendent and school principal, alleging
that the school district's practice of allowing transgender students to access bathrooms and
locker rooms consistent with their gender identity violated their right to privacy under
Fourteenth Amendment, their right of access to educational opportunities to programs,
benefits, and activities under Title IX, and their Pennsylvania common law right of privacy
preventing intrusion upon their seclusion while using bathrooms and locker rooms, and
sought preliminary injunction requiring school district to return to prior practice of requiring
all students to only use the privacy facilities corresponding to their biological sex. Id. at 521,
525; see also Stern, supra note 89.
90. The Alliance Defending Freedom, “a conservative law firm that seeks to legalize
anti-LGBT discrimination through the courts,” filed suit on behalf of “several [high school]
students who said they felt uncomfortable sharing facilities with a transgender classmate.”
Stern, supra note 89.
91. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.12 (2018). To
satisfy the OCR test determining whether an educational institution is controlled by a
religious organization, a religious educational institution need meet only one of the
following requirements: 1) “It is a school or department of divinity,” 2) “It requires its
faculty, students or employees to be members of, or otherwise espouse a personal belief in,
the religion of the [controlling] organization,” or 3) “Its charter . . . contains explicit
statements that it is controlled by a religious organization or [it] is committed to the
doctrines of a particular religion, and the members of its governing body are appointed by
the controlling religious organization . . . , and it receives a significant amount of financial
support from the controlling religious organization . . . .” Exemptions from Title IX, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC.: OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
t9-rel-exempt/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); see also Memorandum from Harry M.
Singleton, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., on Policy Guidance for
Resolving Religious Exemption Requests (Feb. 19, 1985).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2018). Title IX “does not apply to an educational institution
that is controlled by a religious organization to the extent [that] application of [Title IX]
would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.12.
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inclusive housing or restrooms) to the LGBT community. 93 Moreover,
“very few students or employees have challenged an educational
institution’s eligibility for a Title IX exemption.”94 This situation raises the
question of whether the current system for religious exemptions from Title
IX is working effectively to protect LGBT rights.
In a recent landmark California decision, a same-sex couple on the
Pepperdine University women’s basketball team sued the university for sex
discrimination under Title IX.95 The university ultimately prevailed before a
jury because it was exempt from the law on religious grounds at the time
the case was filed; however, the federal judge, in denying the university’s
motion to dismiss found that “sexual orientation discrimination is not a
category distinct from sex or gender discrimination. . . . Simply put, the line
between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is
‘difficult to draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a lingering and
faulty judicial construct.”96 While the case was still pending, “Pepperdine
University’s president submitted a letter to the [Department of Education’s]
Office of Civil Rights requesting a withdrawal of its original Title IX
exemption,” thus relinquishing its power to discriminate against LGBT
students based on religious grounds.97

93. SARAH WARBELOW & REMINGTON GREGG, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, HIDDEN
DISCRIMINATION: TITLE IX RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS PUTTING LGBT STUDENTS AT RISK 10
(2015), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/Title_
IX_Exemptions_Report.pdf. The Department of Education is creating a “searchable database
that reveals the names of colleges and universities who have been granted religious
exemptions from federal civil rights protections.” Katie Barnes, How Title IX Expanded to
Protect LGBT Students, ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017, 1:21 PM ET), https://abcnews.
go.com/Sports/title-ix-expanded-protect-lgbt-students/story?id=44832919.
94. Cara Duchen, Rethinking Religious Exemptions from Title IX After Obergefell, 2017
BYU ED. & L.J. 249, 253.
95. Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1154-57 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The
plaintiffs asserted several allegations against the university, including: violation of their right
to privacy; violation of a California education code that prohibited discrimination at a statefunded postsecondary institution (similar to Title IX); deliberate indifference to harassment,
systemic intentional discrimination and retaliation for complaints about discrimination under
Title IX; violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prevents business entities (in this
case, Pepperdine University) from discriminating against those in California’s jurisdiction;
and an intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1157.
96. Id. at 1159; see also Shivani Patel, Jury Rules Against Former Pepperdine
Basketball Players in Landmark Civil Rights Case, MALIBU TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://www.malibutimes.com/news/article_f150171e-837b-11e7-b274-73e5c72eef79.html.
97. Patel, supra note 97.
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In sum, most educational institutions are subject to both Title VII and
Title IX, including any potential expansion of those statutes to incorporate
protections for sexual orientation and transgender status. While federal
agencies charged with implementing these laws are sending mixed signals
as to how to interpret the prohibition against sex discrimination, courts are
relying more on judicial precedent to expand the scope of this prohibition to
include LGBT interests. Given this trend, employers, in general, should
expect more anti-discrimination lawsuits pursuant to Title VII and Title IX
in the future. At the same time, LGBT advocates are preparing for future
legislation to expand the meaning of religious freedom to allow anti-LGBT
advocates to engage in discriminatory conduct in the workplace and
educational arena. The tension between these issues is destined for the
Supreme Court, which may or may not provide more clarity.
2. State and Local Laws Protecting LGBT Rights
Regardless of whether the federal government and courts take an
expansive view of Title VII and Title IX, employers and schools are still
prohibited from discriminating against LGBT persons on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity under a number of state laws. These states
have enacted comprehensive laws prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, education, housing,
healthcare, adoption and foster care, and public accommodations.98 In
Colorado, for example, there are laws that authorize marriage licenses to
same-sex couples, ban insurance exclusions for transgender healthcare,
facilitate gender marker change on driver’s licenses, and address
harassment and bullying of students or hate crimes based on sexual
orientation and gender identity.99 Wisconsin bans discrimination based on
sexual orientation alone.100
In regard to public accommodations, twenty states and the District of
Columbia ban discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender

98. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 1-4. These states include California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Campaign
State Law Map (June 11, 2018), https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/pdf-all [hereinafter State
Law Map]. One state, Wisconsin, bans discrimination based on sexual orientation alone. Id.
99. State Law Map, supra note 99. Colorado has no restrictions on “conversion
therapy.”
100. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

1092

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1069

identity.101 “Public accommodations refers to both governmental entities
and private businesses that provide services to the general public such as
restaurants, . . . shops,”102 banks, movie theaters, hotels, libraries, and
doctors’ offices. Public accommodation non-discrimination laws protect
LGBT people from being unfairly refused service or entry to, or from
facing discrimination in, places accessible to the public on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity. Forty-eight percent of the LGBT
population live in states prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity in public accommodations.103 The remaining
fifty-two percent of the LGBT population do not have state protection for
sexual orientation and gender identity in their nondiscrimination laws.
In the employment context, twenty-one states, the District of Columbia,
and at least 255 cities and counties have enacted bans on employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
Employment non-discrimination laws protect LGBT people from being
unfairly terminated, denied promotion, or discriminated against in the
workplace by private employers. Minnesota became the first state to ban
employment discrimination based on both sexual orientation and gender
identity when it passed the Human Rights Act in 1993.104 Nine states have
an executive order, administrative order, or personnel regulation prohibiting
discrimination in public employment based on sexual orientation and
gender identity.105 An additional four states have executive orders
101. Id. These states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Washington. In Wisconsin,
public accommodations non-discrimination law covers only sexual orientation. Id. Utah
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in employment
and housing, but not public accommodations. Id.
102. Id.
103. Two percent of the LGBT population lives in states prohibiting public
accommodations discrimination based on sexual orientation only.
104. MINN. STAT. § 363A.01 (2018). In 1993, the Minnesota Legislature amended the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) to prohibit many forms of discrimination on the
basis of “sexual orientation” in the areas of employment, housing, public accommodations,
public service, educational institutions, credit, and business discrimination. Id. § 363A.02.
“The broad definition of ‘sexual orientation’ in MHRA made it the nation’s first state civil
rights law to protect transgender individuals from discrimination.” Human Rights
Protections in Minnesota, OUTFRONT MINN., http://outfront.hutman.net/library/humanrights
(last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
105. These states include Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See State Maps of Laws & Policies: Employment, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
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prohibiting discrimination in public employment based on sexual
orientation only.106
In addition to state laws, numerous local ordinances prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in
employment and public accommodations. Today, more than four hundred
cities and counties have laws in place protecting LGBT persons from sex
discrimination in the workplace and the marketplace.107 Most of these cities
and counties are located within states that have similar statewide
nondiscrimination laws.108 While the vast majority of local ordinances
include employment, housing, and public accommodations, some
ordinances are not as comprehensive. The level of enforcement of these
ordinances varies depending on the jurisdiction.
Some states have enacted blocking statutes, preventing passage or
enforcement of state or local nondiscrimination laws. In North Carolina, for
instance, House Bill 142 restricts cities and counties from protecting against
discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity.109 The effect has been a decline in business
for the state, including the cancellation of NCAA tournaments that were
scheduled to be held in Charlotte.110 The Arkansas Supreme Court recently
“struck down a local law that protected [LGBT persons] in the city of
Fayetteville from discrimination.”111 The court wrote:
In essence, [the city ordinance] is a municipal decision to expand
the provisions of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act to include
persons of a particular sexual orientation and gender identity.
This violates the plain wording of [the state law] by extending
106. Alaska, Arizona, Missouri, and Ohio.
107. Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances that Include Gender
Identity, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-nondiscrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender (last updated Jan. 28, 2018).
108. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
109. Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act, H.B. DRH40005-TC-1B, 2016 Gen.
Assemb., 2d. Special Sess. (N.C. 2016), https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015E2/Bills/
House/PDF/H2v0.pdf.
110. Andrew Carter, NCAA Polls Championship Events from North Carolina over HB2,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 13, 2016, 12:39 PM), https://www.charlotteobserver.
com/sports/article101464492.html.
111. Rebecca Hersher, Arkansas Supreme Court Strikes Down Local Anti-Discrimination
Law, NPR (Feb. 23, 2017, 3:11 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/02/23/516702975/arkansas-supreme-court-strikes-down-local-anti-discriminationlaw. The Arkansas legislature passed a state law “barring cities from passing broad antidiscrimination statutes.” Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

1094

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1069

discrimination laws in the City of Fayetteville to include two
classifications not previously included under state law.112
The City of Fayetteville’s attorney argued that the local law was legal
because a state anti-bullying statute covered discrimination on the basis of
gender identity and sexual orientation, but this argument failed.113
To limit the expansion of LGBT rights at the local level, several state
legislatures have enacted religious exemption laws. More than twenty states
have passed state religious exemption laws allowing people to refuse
services to LGBT people based on religious or moral opposition to samesex marriage, extramarital sex, or transgender identity.114 In Tennessee, the
state legislature recently enacted a “religious freedom” measure (Senate
Bill 1556) allowing counselors and therapists to deny service to a patient if
doing so would conflict with the counselor’s “sincerely held principles.”115
Mississippi also passed a religious freedom bill (House Bill 1523),
according to Governor Phil Bryant, “to protect sincerely held religious
beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, organizations and private
associations from discriminatory action by state government.”116 In 2015,
112. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 510 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Ark. 2017). In this
case, Protect Fayetteville filed suit challenging a city ordinance that provides for the right
“to be free from discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity.” Id. at
260. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Fayetteville ordinance violated a state
statute precluding municipalities from adopting or enforcing an ordinance that creates a
protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law. Id.
at 263.
113. Id.
114. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 13-19.
115. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-22-302 (West 2016). The anti-LGBT law allows licensed
counselors in private practice to use their own religious beliefs as an excuse for terminating
care or referring away clients because of moral objections to how the client identifies. See
also Emma Margolin, Tennessee Enacts ‘Religious Freedom’ Measure, MSNBC (Apr. 28,
2018, 5:13 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/tennessee-enacts-religious-freedommeasure.
116. CNN Wire, Mississippi Passes Religious Freedom Bill That LGBT Groups Call
Discriminatory, CBS NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016, 9:04 PM), https://wtvr.com/2016/04/05/
mississippi-passes-religious-freedom-bill-that-lgbt-groups-call-discriminatory/. “The socalled Religious Liberty Accommodations Act is meant to protect people, businesses, and
organizations with ‘sincerely held’ religious beliefs about the sanctity of traditional
marriage. The bill also says gender is determined by ‘an individual’s immutable biological
sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at time of birth.’” Becca Andrews, A
Federal Judge Just Blocked One of the Nation’s Most Sweeping Anti-LGBT Laws, MOTHER
JONES (Apr. 1, 2016, 9:11 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/04/mississippipasses-new-anti-lgbt-law-masked-religious-liberty; see also Ashley Fantz, North Carolina,
Mississippi Measures Have Companions Elsewhere in U.S., CNN (Apr. 7, 2016, 12:47 AM
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former Indiana Governor Mike Pence signed a similar religious exemption
law, but a boycott imposed by businesses across the state forced lawmakers
to amend it before it took effect.117 Approximately 200 bills have been
proposed in state legislatures around the country that could lead to
discrimination against LGBT people, and nearly half of these bills invoke
religion or the right to free expression of religion to justify refusing goods
and services to LGBT people.
Lawmakers opposed to expanding LGBT protections argue that the right
to religious freedom should trump the principle of nondiscrimination when
it comes to LGBT rights. LGBT advocates, on the other hand, contend that
invoking religious liberty is nothing more than a pretext to justify continued
sex discrimination against LGBT people in employment, housing,
education, public accommodations, and other areas. This conflict of
American values was elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court this past term by
a Colorado baker and a same-sex couple in a dispute over a wedding cake
near Denver. The next section examines whether the Supreme Court, in one
of the most anticipated rulings of the 2017-2018 term, resolved this conflict
in favor of religious liberty or LGBT rights.
III. Masterpiece Cakeshop: Striking the Balance Between Religious
Freedom and Nondiscrimination, or Not
A. The Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision and Its Legal Implications
The Masterpiece Cakeshop case arose from a brief encounter in 2012
between a gay couple, David Mullins and Charlie Craig, and a bakery
owner, Jack Phillips, when the couple visited Phillips’ bakery, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, in Lakewood, Colorado.118 The cakeshop offered a variety of
baked goods, including cookies, brownies, and custom-designed cakes for
special events, such as weddings and birthday parties.119 The couple was
planning to marry in Massachusetts and was looking for a wedding cake for
a local reception to celebrate the upcoming same-sex marriage. Phillips, a

ET),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/06/us/nationwide-bill-religious-freedom-sexualorientation/index.html.
117. Tony Cook, Tom LoBianco & Doug Stanglin, Indiana Governor Signs Amended
“Religious Freedom” Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:50 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2015/04/02/indiana-religious-freedom-law-deal-gaydiscrimination/70819106/.
118. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018).
119. Id. at 1724.
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devout Christian, turned down the couple’s request for a wedding cake,
saying that he would not use his talents to convey a message of support for
same-sex marriage at odds with his religious faith.120 Phillips informed the
couple that he would make them “birthday cakes, shower cakes, [or would]
sell [them] cookies or brownies,” but that he would “not ‘create’ wedding
cakes for same-sex weddings.”121 Humiliated by Phillips’s refusal to serve
them, the couple filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, alleging that Phillips had violated the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act (CADA), which prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation.122
During its investigation, the Commission learned that Phillips had
declined to sell custom wedding cakes to same-sex couples on multiple
occasions, claiming religious freedom. On one occasion, “Phillips’ shop
had refused to sell cupcakes to a [same-sex] couple for their ‘commitment
celebration.’”123 Thus, Phillips’s actions appeared to be motivated by more
than just religious opposition to same-sex marriage. The state
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who adjudicated the dispute found that
Phillips’s actions constituted prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, not simply opposition to same-sex marriage.124
“The Commission ordered Phillips to ‘cease and desist from
discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by refusing to sell them
wedding cakes or any product [he] would sell to heterosexual couples.’” He
was instructed to rewrite his company policies and to pay for and conduct
“comprehensive staff training,” so that no similar request is refused in the
120. Id. “To Phillips,” according to the Court, “creating a wedding cake for a same-sex
wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own
most deeply held beliefs.” Id. “One of Phillips' religious beliefs is that ‘God's intention for
marriage from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the union of one man and
one woman.’” Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1725. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) prohibits
discrimination based on sexual orientation in a “place of business engaged in any sales to the
public and any place offering services . . . to the public.” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34601(1) (West 2014). CADA establishes steps for the administrative review of discrimination
claims which include (1) an investigation of a complaint by the Colorado Civil Rights
Division; (2) referral of the matter to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission if probable
cause is found to exist; by the division, (3) initiation of a formal hearing before a state
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who will hear evidence and argument and issue a written
decision; and (4) referral back to the Commission for a public hearing and deliberative
session before voting on the case. Id. §§ 24-34-306, 24-4-105(14).
123. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
124. Id.
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future.125 The Commission further ordered him to make quarterly
compliance reports for two years about his remedial and retraining
measures, and to log the number of customer celebrations he declines and
the reason why.126 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission’s decision de novo, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined
to take the case up on appeal.127
In June 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 7-2 ruling, reversed the
Colorado court’s decision and ruled in favor of the baker, arguing that
members of the Commission showed hostility toward the baker based on
his religious beliefs.128 Justice Anthony Kennedy, who wrote the majority
opinion, concluded that the Commission, based on comments made by
individual commissioners in the hearings, had failed to give “neutral and
respectful consideration” to Phillips’s claim that his right to free exercise of
religion entitled him to disregard the state’s anti-discrimination law.129 The
Court did not determine whether the baker’s religious freedom claim
prevailed over the couple’s antidiscrimination claim in denying the couple’s
request to purchase a wedding cake, just that the baker was denied a fair
opportunity to present his claim based on the Commission’s conduct during
the proceedings. “The Commission’s hostility,” Justice Kennedy wrote,
“was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be
applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion.”130
The Supreme Court focused on several aspects of the case which, in its
view, overshadowed the key question of how to resolve the conflict
between religious freedom and nondiscrimination in a public
accommodation setting where discrimination based on sexual orientation is
at issue. First, the Court noted that Phillips’s actions leading to the refusal
of service all occurred in 2012, prior to Obergefell and Colorado’s
recognition of the validity of same-sex marriage. According to the Court,
the baker was not unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to
take an action that he understood to be an expression of support
for their validity when that expression was contrary to his
sincerely held religious beliefs, at least insofar as his refusal was
limited to refusing to create and express a message in support of

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
Id. at 1729.
Id. at 1732.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

1098

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1069

gay marriage, even one planned to take place in another State.131
Thus, the timing of this dispute was not optimal because it preceded
Obergefell and the expansion of LGBT rights that occurred after this
landmark decision.
Second, the Court concluded that the Commission was inconsistent in its
treatment of Phillips as compared to similarly situated Colorado bakers in
the so-called “William Jack cases” filed with the Commission.132 In these
cases, the Court noted the Commission’s finding that “a baker acted
lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations that demeaned gay
persons or gay marriages.”133 However, the Commission found Phillips to
be in violation of Colorado’s anti-discrimination law for declining to create
a wedding cake for his customers. Moreover, the Court highlighted the
inconsistency in the Commission’s treatment of the bakers in the William
Jack cases and Phillips, all of whom offered other products in the shop to
their customers.134 The Court’s view of the Commission’s “disparate
consideration” of the various Colorado bakers was that the Commission
was hostile towards Phillips to ignore his First Amendment claim, but not
the claims of the other bakers.135 The Court concluded that the “attempt to
account for the difference in treatment elevates one view of what is
offensive over another and itself sends a signal of official disapproval of
Phillips’ religious beliefs.”136
The Court’s assumption that the bakers in the William Jack cases were
similarly situated to Phillips’s case was a key factor in its finding of
disparate treatment by the Commission. But Phillips’s refusal to produce
131. Id. at 1728. To Phillips, using his artistic skills to make an expressive statement on a
wedding cake is a free speech right that he—the baker—enjoys because it implicates his
sincere religious beliefs. Id. at 1726.
132. Id. at 1732.
133. Id. at 1728 (citing Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Mar. 24, 2015);
Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar
Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Mar. 24, 2015)).
134. Id. at 1730.
135. Id. at 1732.
136. Id. “William Jack visited three Colorado bakeries [where] [h]e requested two cakes
‘made to resemble an open Bible’” and “decorated with Biblical verses.” Id. at 1749
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “[He] requested that one of the cakes include an image of two
groomsmen holding hands with a red ‘X’ over the image. On one cake, he asked the baker to
inscribe the phrase ‘God hates sin.’ Psalm 45:7 and the opposite side of the cake
Homosexuality is a detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2.’ On the second cake,” he requested the
words, “‘God loves sinners’ and on the other side ‘While we were yet sinners Christ died for
us. Roman 5:8.’” Id.
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for a same-sex couple a wedding cake that he regularly sold to other
customers was distinct from the other bakers’ refusal to make Jack cakes of
a kind they would not make for anyone else. Jack requested that Biblical
versus or phrases condemning homosexuality be inscribed on his cake.
There was no message or anything else distinguishing the cake that the
same-sex couple wanted to buy from any other wedding cake Phillips
would have sold. The bakers in the Jack cases would have refused to make
a cake with Jack’s requested message “for any customer, regardless of []
sexual orientation,” whereas Phillips’s refusal to serve a same-sex couple
was for “no reason other than their sexual orientation.”137 Thus, the three
bakers treated Jack as they would have treated any other customer, whereas
Phillips treated the customers differently from other heterosexual customers
and in a way that the Colorado anti-discrimination law prohibits.
Third, the Court placed substantial emphasis on the Commission’s
treatment of Phillips during the case, arguing that the Commission “violated
the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations
on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”138 In particular, the Court
was troubled with disparaging remarks made by some of the commissioners
during the Commission’s public hearings. The Court saw the Colorado
Commission as endorsing the idea that “religious beliefs cannot
legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain.”139
One commissioner suggested that Phillips cannot act on his religious beliefs
“if he decides to do business in the state.”140 At a subsequent hearing, a
commissioner stated:
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery,
whether it be the holocaust . . . . [I]t is one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to
hurt others.141
These comments, in the Court’s perspective, “cast doubt on the fairness and
impartiality of the Commission’s adjudication of [the] case.”142 The
Commission, according to the Court, “gave ‘every appearance’ of
adjudicating Phillips’ religious objection based on a negative normative
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1721.
Id.
Id. at 1729.
Id.
Id. at 1730.
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‘evaluation of the particular justification’ for his objection and the religious
grounds for it.”143
It is questionable whether the Court should have given such weight to the
statements of a few commissioners in determining whether Phillips’s
refusal to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple violated CADA.
Procedurally, the proceedings involved several levels of independent
review and decision-making, of which the Commission was but one. The
Division, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Colorado Court of
Appeals in a de novo review each produced its own findings consistent with
the Commission’s conclusions. As the dissenting opinion points out, the
majority opinion does not describe the prejudice affecting the
determinations of the adjudicators before or after the Commission in any
way.144 Instead, the Court relies heavily on its decision in Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, “where the government action that violated a
principle of religious neutrality implicated a sole decisionmaking body, the
city council.”145
Finally, the Court reiterated the importance of the principle of neutrality
when the Free Exercise Clause is invoked. Citing Hialeah, the Court wrote
that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause bars even ‘subtle departures from
neutrality’ on matters of religion.”146 In the majority’s view, the
Commission’s hostility toward Phillips was inconsistent not only with its
treatment of other bakers, but with the First Amendment’s guarantee of
neutral treatment toward religion. “Phillips was entitled to a neutral
decisionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious
objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this
case was presented,” the Court concluded.147
Because the Court determined that Phillips did not receive the benefit of
a fair and impartial adjudicatory process, it did not address the larger
question of whether the right to religious liberty must yield to an otherwise
valid exercise of state power to ban discrimination in public
accommodations based on sexual orientation. However, the Supreme Court
did state in dicta “a general rule that [religious and philosophical]
objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy
and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services
143. Id. at 1731.
144. Id. at 1749-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1751-52 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534 (1993).
146. Id. at 1731 (quoting Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534).
147. Id. at 1732.
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under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.”148
“Gay persons may be spared from ‘indignities when they seek goods and
services in an open market,’” according to the Court.149 This recognition of
the role of state anti-discrimination laws in protecting same-sex couples
suggests that business owners may not simply put up signs denying goods
and services used for gay marriages. There must be a valid First
Amendment defense to justify such action, and even then, it is unclear how
this conflict of principles will be resolved.
B. The Aftermath of Masterpiece Cakeshop and Its Legal Effect
Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Phillips in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, its reasoning was narrow in scope and did not diminish LGBT
rights as originally feared. The Court’s opinion was focused more on the
Commission’s hostile attitude towards Phillips’s religiosity than his
discriminatory conduct or the substance of his religious liberty defense. In
fact, the Court—in dicta—signaled to future courts its support for a more
inclusive approach toward LGBT people in public accommodations. Justice
Kennedy wrote:
Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay
couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in
dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution
can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of
their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to
others must be given great weight and respect by the courts.150
Moreover, the Court noted that the lower federal courts still have work to
do in bringing the appropriate case to the Supreme Court that will resolve
the conflict between religious freedom and nondiscrimination claims in
public accommodations. According to Justice Kennedy:
The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await
further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing
that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without
undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without
subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and
services in an open market.151
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1727.
Id. at 1732.
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Opponents of LGBT rights, however, see the Masterpiece Cakeshop
decision in starkly different terms. Some view it as a call to arms to turn
LGBT people away in public accommodations, while others interpret it
more cautiously as a small step in support of religious freedom. In
Tennessee, for example, a local hardware owner celebrated the Supreme
Court’s decision “by placing a ‘No Gays Allowed’ sign in front of his
store.” The store owner declared “the decision a victory for Christianity.”152
The Court in its opinion emphasized that religious and philosophical
objections to gay marriage are protected views and in certain instances are
protected forms of expression. Citing Obergefell, the Court observed that
“[t]he First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are
given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so
fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.”153 The Wall Street
Journal, however, criticized the Court’s nod to religious freedom as a
“muddle provid[ing] only gossamer protection.”154
The first test case to assess the impact of Masterpiece Cakeshop was
decided in Arizona a few days after the Court announced its holding. An
Arizona Court of Appeals in Brush & Nib Studio v. Phoenix considered a
challenge to a local nondiscrimination ordinance that makes it illegal for
businesses to refuse service to anyone based on sexual orientation and
gender identity.155 The studio is in the business of selling cards and
152. Justin Wise, Tennessee Store Puts ‘No Gays Allowed’ Sign Back Up After Supreme
Court Cake Ruling, HILL (June 7, 2018, 4:51 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/homenews/statewatch/391249-tennessee-store-puts-no-gays-allowed-sign-back-up-after-supreme-courtcake-ruling. The store owner initially posted the sign in 2015 in response to the Obergefell
decision. See id.
153. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2607 (2015)).
154. Sohrab Ahmari, Social Conservatism After Masterpiece Cakeshop, COMMENT. MAG.
(June 6, 2018), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/social-conservatismafter-masterpiece-cakeshop.
155. Brush & Nib Studio, LC, v. Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0602, at 6-7 (Ariz. Ct. App.
June 7, 2018), http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Div1/2018/1%20CACV%2016-0602.pdf. “Brush & Nib is a calligraphy shop represented by Alliance Defending
Freedom (ADF), the Religious Right legal group that represents Masterpiece and several
other businesses in related cases.” Liz Hayes, The Ripple Effect of the Supreme Court’s
Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision, AM. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH & ST., (June 8,
2018), https://www.au.org/blogs/wall-of-separation/the-ripple-effect-of-the-supreme-courtsmasterpiece-cakeshop-decision; see also Terry Tancy, Court Upholds Phoenix Law over
Same-Sex Wedding Invitations, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 7, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/
1fdbeaf17dab4c55891da91e5d414b62/Arizona-court-rules-for-city-on-same-sex-weddinginvitations [hereinafter Phoenix Ordinance Article].
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decorations for weddings and special events.156 The studio’s evangelical
owners argued that the ordinance violated their First Amendment right to
free expression of religion by prohibiting the company from denying
service to same-sex couples who wish to celebrate their weddings.157 The
Arizona court upheld the LGBT nondiscrimination law and concluded that
Christian owners of a studio open to the general public must not
“discriminate against potential patrons based on sexual orientation.” 158
Judge Lawrence Winthrop, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel,
explained that “the primary purpose of [the business] was not to convey a
particular message but rather to engage in commercial sales activity.”159
Citing Masterpiece Cakeshop and a number of state law cases rejecting
similar claims brought by bakers, florists, photographers, and venue rental
owners, Judge Winthrop concluded that “[t]he case before us is one of a
blanket refusal of service to the LGBTQ community.”160 Importantly, the
Arizona court’s decision in Brush & Nib Studios suggests that state courts
will apply Masterpiece Cakeshop broadly to protect LGBT rights in the
marketplace, at least where local law prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity.
However, the Supreme Court again signaled its unwillingness to resolve
the tension between religious freedom and LGBT equality when, in late
June 2018, it ordered the Washington Supreme Court to revisit its decision
to fine a Christian florist for violating a state law prohibiting discrimination
against same-sex couples.161 In State v. Arlene’s Flowers, the Benton

156. See Carol Kuruvilla, Wedding Invitation Business Can’t Shun Same-Sex Couples,
Arizona Court Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/wedding-invitation-business-same-sex-couples-arizona-court_us_5b19a797e4b09d7a3
d707a37.
157. The studio was run by Christian owners, Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski,
who argue[d] that they cannot separate their religious beliefs from their work.
They want[ed] to post a public statement to notify potential customers that their
studio won’t create artwork that “demeans others, endorses racism, incites
violence, contradicts [their] Christian faith, or promotes any marriage except
marriage between one man and one woman.”
Id. The company produced “custom-designed wedding invitations, among other products.”
Id.
158. Brush & Nib Studio, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0602, at 15.
159. Id. at 19.
160. Id. at 15.
161. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated and remanded
sub nom., Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.). Stutzman
had previously sold the couple flowers and knew they were gay; however, on the day of the
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County Superior Court fined Barronelle Stutzman, a local florist, $1000 for
denying wedding-related services to a same-sex couple, Robert Ingersoll
and Curt Freed, in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination
(WLAD) and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).162 On appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision, stating that
“[Stutzman’s] floral arrangements do not constitute protected free speech,
and that providing flowers to a same-sex wedding would not serve as an
endorsement of same-sex marriage.”163 Unlike the Masterpiece Cakeshop
decision, there was no finding of religious hostility towards Stutzman in the
court proceedings leading up to the state court’s decision.164 The
Washington Supreme Court wrote:
As every other court to address the question has concluded,
public accommodations laws do not simply guarantee access to
goods or services. Instead, they serve a broader societal purpose:
eradicating barriers to the equal treatment of all citizens in the
commercial marketplace. . . . Were we to carve out a patchwork
of exceptions for ostensibly justified discrimination, that purpose
would be fatally undermined.165
The court further concluded that “this case is no more about access to
flowers than civil rights cases in the 1960s were about access to
sandwiches.”166 The U.S. Supreme Court, in granting Stutzman’s petition
for certiorari, stated in a single sentence that the case should be remanded to
the lower court “for further consideration in light” of the Masterpiece
Cakeshop decision.167 According to Professor Steve Vladeck at the
University of Texas Law School, “[I]t’s quite possible that this onesentence order will open the door to serious disagreements among the lower

attempted purchase, she told them that she could not provide flowers for their wedding
because same-sex marriage was incompatible with her Christian beliefs. Id. at 549.
162. Id. at 550; Rachel La Corte, Washington Court Rules Against Florist in Gay
Wedding Case, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 17, 2017, 12:41 PM ET), https://www.detroitnews.
com/story/news/nation/2017/02/16/gay-wedding-florist/97997040/2017.
163. La Corte, supra note 164; see also id. at 557.
164. Robert Barnes, Justices Decline to Rule on Florist Who Refused Wedding Services
to Same-Sex Couple, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/courts_law/justices-decline-to-rule-on-florist-who-refused-to-serve-same-sexcouple/2018/06/25/c7bb1916-787c-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story.html (via subscription).
165. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 851-52.
166. Id. at 851.
167. Arlene's Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671, 2671 (2018).
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courts over when and under what circumstances business owners can refuse
to serve same-sex couples . . . .”168
It is too early to determine whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to
remand the Arlene Flower’s case is a positive or negative development for
LGBT rights. Had the Court denied the florist’s petition for certiorari, it
would have sent a positive signal to the LGBT community that the
Washington Supreme Court was correct in its decision to rule in favor of
the same-sex couple. On the other hand, had the Court taken the case up on
appeal for the 2018-2019 term, this would have been more problematic for
the couple and LGBT rights in general. Instead, the Court chose for the
second time this term not to show its hand and to leave it up to the lower
courts to sort out whether a business owner’s religious beliefs can justify
the denial of wedding services to a same-sex couple in public
accommodations.
Similar cases involving the clash between religious freedom and
nondiscrimination are pending in other states as well. In Minnesota, a
federal district court judge dismissed a suit challenging a state law for the
right to refuse to shoot wedding videos for same-sex couples.169 In his
ruling, U.S. District Court Judge Tunheim described the business owner’s
actions as “conduct akin to a 'White Applicants Only' sign” that may be
outlawed without infringing on First Amendment rights.170 The
videography company, Telescope Media, filed an appeal with the Eighth
Circuit in October 2017, and a decision is expected this coming term. 171 In
Kentucky, too, the state Supreme Court is examining whether a local sexual
orientation and gender identity nondiscrimination provision can compel a
Lexington printer to provide T-shirts with messages that violate his
religious beliefs. The Lexington Human Rights Commission, in 2012,
determined that a T-shirt order for organizers of a Lexington gay pride
festival should have been filled by the printer despite his religious freedom
168. Ariane de Vogue & Eli Watkins, Supreme Court Won’t Take Up Case of Florist
Who Refused Service for Same-Sex Couple, CNN (June 25, 2018, 10:53 AM ET),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/25/politics/supreme-court-flowers/index.html.
169. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017).
170. Id. at 1112.
171. Christine Hauser, Minnesota Videographers Said They Don’t Have to Film Gay
Weddings. A Judge Disagreed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/22/us/minnesota-gay-marriage-video.html; Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey,
FREEDOM FOR ALL AM., https://www.freedomforallamericans.org/telescope-media-group-vlindsey/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); Emily Zantow, Videographers Argue for Right to Refuse
Gay Couples, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.
com/videographers-argue-for-right-to-refuse-gay-couples.
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claim.172 These and other cases will likely result in a divergence of opinions
among courts attempting to answer the question of whether religious
freedom trumps nondiscrimination in the marketplace, at least until the
current U.S. Supreme Court, which now includes a new conservative
Justice, takes another look at the issue.
IV. Conclusion
Since the 2015 Obergefell decision, U.S. courts have been working to
strike the right balance between the promotion of LGBT equality and the
protection of religious liberty in cases involving sex discrimination based
on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, education, public
accommodations, and other areas. To date, courts have interpreted the
prohibition against “sex” discrimination in Title VII, Title IX, and
numerous state statutes to allow LGBT people to seek recourse and redress
when they are fired, refused promotion, or denied goods and services based
on sexual orientation or gender identity. At the same time, lawmakers who
oppose same-sex marriage and transgender equality have enacted religious
exemption laws in some states to protect employers and business owners
who claim that compliance with certain nondiscrimination laws violates
their religious or moral beliefs. These religious exemption laws have
opened the door for individuals to assert religious or moral objections to
justify discriminatory actions taken against LGBT people.
Freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination are core principles
under U.S. law, and neither lawmakers nor judges can trample upon these
basic freedoms. The tension between these freedoms, however, lies at the
crux of the political and cultural divide in the United States over LGBT
rights, and the courts are now being asked to decide which of these basic
freedoms should prevail when the two are in conflict. Currently, lawsuits
are pending in several states involving the denial of services to LGBT
people by hospitals, banks, funeral homes, child placement agencies,
educational institutions, and small businesses who oppose same-sex
marriage or transgender equality on religious or moral grounds. Some of
these lawsuits involve more comprehensive nondiscrimination statutes or
ordinances that bar discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity, while other cases hinge on laws more limited in scope.

172. Richard Nelson, Supreme Court Ruling May Impact KY. Religious-Liberty Case,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (June 7, 2018, 5:18 PM), http://www.kentucky.com/
opinion/op-ed/article212767209.html.
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The highly anticipated Masterpiece Cakeshop decision was expected to
resolve the question of whether a business owner’s religious beliefs can
justify the denial of products and services to LGBT customers in the area of
public accommodations. But the Supreme Court ultimately dodged the
question, instead focusing on procedural irregularities with the case and the
Colorado Commission’s dismissive attitude towards a cakeshop owner’s
claim of religious freedom under the First Amendment. In the end, the
Masterpiece Cakeshop decision will have less of an impact on LGBT rights
and religious freedom advocacy than originally predicted. However, some
of the dicta in Justice Kennedy’s opinion will likely be used by both sides
in future disputes involving discrimination against LGBT people in the
workplace and the marketplace. For the time being, the law as it applies to
LGBT people in the United States will remain a patchwork quilt of federal,
state, and local protections prohibiting discrimination in various areas of
economic and social life.
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